A new case for CANZUK
One of the less discussed parts of Boris Johnson’s time as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was his negotiation of the UK’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). With negotiations beginning in ‘21, concluding in ‘23, and membership kicking into effect on 15th December 2024, Britain joining the agreement represents a new and exciting opportunity to deepen trading links with the Indo-Pacific countries, including the first forging of a UK-Malaysia free trading deal. British membership of the bloc represents a small part of the Indo-Pacific pivot central to the post-Brexit foreign policy of the previous Conservative government. Membership also presents a real opportunity to begin thinking seriously about CANZUK.
Multilateral agreements between the CANZUK countries - that is, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom - have long been proposed, and attracted varying levels of political support within each country (supporters include Boris Johnson, Tony Abbott and the Canadian Conservative Party). Britain’s accession to the CPTPP marks the achievement of one CANZUK objective: that of the establishment of a free trade area between CANZUK countries. Of course, British membership of CPTPP remains unratified by Canada, and a bespoke Canadian-UK deal is yet to be negotiated. This is probably due to concerns in Ottawa over Canada’s dairy industry. Trump’s tariffs, and the potential for the present Trudeau government to be replaced by a pro-CANZUK Conservative government in incoming Canadian elections, will likely heighten the chance of a deal. This should be a strong medium-term objective for CANZUK advocates. The need for closer cooperation between all four countries, facilitated by robust bilateral and multilateral deepening of ties, remains more acute than ever.
Trump’s victory in DC is already sending shockwaves around the world. Whether one counts his success as a good or bad thing for America, or a good or bad thing for the rest of us (the two not necessarily correlated), it is inevitable that his Presidency will involve significant shifts in US foreign policy around the globe. It is incumbent on CANZUK governments, then, to take the time to adjust our own expectations and diplomatic actions accordingly. Trump has moved American foreign policy toward a more transactional approach, isolating the country from allies he sees as not sufficiently paying their way. He has called for a reduction in aid for Ukraine and is currently threatening Canada with sanctions which would affect 77% of their total exports.
It is clear that Trump necessitates a paradigm shift in CANZUK foreign policy. Whilst Canada is the CANZUK nation most reliant on Trump, all CANZUK nations have strong trading relationships and diplomatic partnerships with the US and CANZUK nations remain highly vulnerable to American tariffs and Trump’s transactionalism. A qualification must be made here for far-away Australia, which is less vulnerable to the impact of American tariffs, with exports to America only constituting 4.3% of Australian trade overall in 2023. This is still a significant percentage, but not quite economy-busting. Whilst it would be foolish in the extreme for any of the CANZUK countries to damage our partnerships with the largest economic and military power in the globe, there is a clear need to develop economic and diplomatic sufficiency so as to increase resilience to Trump-driven diplomatic shocks. The question of how to cultivate this sufficiency is complex and multi-faceted: mutual agreements between CANZUK countries are a part of the puzzle.
Of course, Trump is not the only disruptive force to the settled nature of CANZUK international politics. Russian expansionism in Ukraine and conflicts waged by Iranian-backed proxies in the Middle East threaten NATO’s interests, providing a shared adversary for the UK, Canada and - in their capacity as a NATO global partner - Australia to rally their diplomatic energies around. For example, Australia has currently given $1.5 billion in aid to Ukraine so far, despite their great distance. It is my view that CANZUK advocates should be open to a smaller CAUK grouping within a wider CANZUK model to facilitate active defence cooperation within existing networks and beyond - though New Zealand may be a sensible partner for simple defensive pacts, there are positive reasons (such as shared association with NATO mentioned above) and negative reasons (policy barriers within New Zealand, described later) that may make any proactive cooperation between CANZUK countries in defence related issues challenging. Meanwhile, China’s global economic dominance, expansionary foreign policy in South-East Asia and human rights abuses in Hong Kong make it a major disrupter of CANZUK interests.
Often expressed through economic means, the CPTPP provides a way for CANZUK countries to collaborate in resisting this, through deepening trading links and economic support to several key South-East Asian States - this should be a cornerstone of pro-CANZUK policy. Presenting China merely as a threat, whilst ignoring the economic trade and real partnerships cultivated by western countries with it, is over simplistic. One value of CANZUK is that it could enable CANZUK countries to erode Chinese influence within their own politics and economies, allowing a less conflicted policy line to be pursued. It is worth noting that New Zealand in particular tends to take a more pro-China line then her CANZUK peers, including being the first developed nation to sign a free trade agreement with China and being a participant in the Belt and Road Initiative though they have taken a more bullish line with China more recently.
It is against this background that the United Kingdom finally joins the CPTPP and establishes a comprehensive free trade agreement with her CANZUK partners. CANZUK cooperation should not be presented as a means of single-handedly resolving the above concerns, and CANZUK countries should continue to pursue their own relationships with external partners, but moving toward CANZUK cooperation will be key in any successful broader strategies aimed at the mitigation of emerging geopolitical risks, the promotion of sufficiency from China and America (I note again - sufficiency does not mean an end to cooperation) and the establishment of new, robust strategic, economic and diplomatic partnerships.
Within the CANZUK movement, suggestions of what such an alliance might look like range from increasing bilateral ties between individual members to far-reaching multilateral commitments rivalling multinational blocs like the EU. Though strong bilateral ties is indeed part of the foundation upon which a CANZUK alliance might be built, limiting cooperation to only this form may prove underambitious and end up compromising the potential held by the idea. On the other end of the spectrum, complex multilateral commitments - particularly ones with an air of the federative - are challenging to secure public support for (especially in a Britain still jaded by Brexit), risk eroding national sovereignty and can end up inflexible.
A middle ground may be possible. A set of distinct, modular, sovereignty-respecting agreements building on the foundation of existing bilateral ties and shared membership of pre-existing multilateral bodies (particularly CPTPP, NATO, Five Eyes and AUKUS) provides one alternative. Such a model would not discard the strong links these countries have cultivated with external partners over decades, nor would it impede collaboration as a consequence of disputes localised to specific policy areas. For example, New Zealand may be reluctant to engage in an active defensive alliance with the UK due to New Zealand’s strict no-nuclear policy and diverging interests more broadly. It would be impractical and insensible in the extreme to expect New Zealand to change cornerstones of their foreign policy to accommodate an agreement. We must not miss the opportunity to allow Canada, Australia and the UK from developing closer defensive ties without restriction (potentially as a CAUK grouping within the broader CANZUK group). It would be a profound tragedy to allow differences in defence policy to prevent real opportunities for cooperation in other areas.
A more modular approach may also allow for limited expansion of the CANZUK alliance. Like CANZUK countries, Ireland is Anglophone, liberal, aligned with western interests and presents a developed economy. It may be well within the interests of CANZUK to remove barriers to migration in and out of Ireland, for example by expanding any potential collaboration in mutual recognition of qualifications to the Republic. However, Ireland is part of the EU, limiting economic cooperation, and their status as a tax haven may make shared mobility of capital undesirable. A modular approach could thus incorporate a nation like Ireland where doing so is beneficial and practical for both CANZUK countries and the prospective partner, without needing to involve them in the entirety of the alliance. There is also potential for defensive collaboration with small, Commonwealth Pacific-Islander states, potentially as part of a broader strategy to combat Chinese influence in the region - a modular approach allows this without necessitating involving these countries in, for example, migratory agreements which may face scrutiny by anti-migration political groups in Canada and the UK. Notably, an open defensive policy may have prevented the formation of a comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the Solomon Islands, and could prevent similar moves by China in the future
There are pertinent questions over what areas such modular agreements might cover. Commentators have made reference to the potential for defensive collaboration; a mutual recognition of qualifications between countries; shared cooperation in space potentially culminating in the foundation of a shared space agency; creation of a free movement of people area; and a shared opposition to Chinese expansionism, humans rights abuses and economic imperialism. Any one of these policies would reflect a realignment of priorities for constituent countries, with moves toward cooperation in space and toward a distinct defensive pact being especially valuable in mitigating the dangerous lack of self-sufficiency maintained by CANZUK countries in these areas. Space, in particular, remains a sector dominated by the United States and China without much movement from middle powers - it’s possible a CANZUK space union, drawing on the unique and distinct strengths and priorities of the space agencies in the bloc, could see CANZUK play a leading role in the emerging sector. No combination of these movements would eliminate the economic and geopolitical vulnerabilities of CANZUK nations overnight, but closer alignment would represent a clear step and signal that policymaking in these countries is moving toward and aspiring to a stronger, more autonomous and more impactful position on the world stage. For the UK in particular, association with a distinct multilateral bloc to the European Union could help it reassert its legitimacy as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and as a major diplomatic player globally.
Such policies as the above - or similar yet subtly distinct suggestions from other pro-CANZUK commentators - would also involve an informal deepening of ties as CANZUK nations would become consequently more economically, diplomatically, culturally and defensively integrated as a consequence of CANZUK arrangements. This ideally would naturally strengthen already-existing diplomatic alignments between CANZUK nations, allowing a more effective shared advancement of our interests on the world stage. These agreements, coupled with broader shared multilateral commitments like CPTPP, Five Eyes, AUKUS and NATO, would thus afford a degree of autonomy and insulation to CANZUK countries, partially protecting us from shocks arising from growing isolationist policy in America and geopolitical risks posed by China and other bad actors.
CANZUK is needed now more than ever. Barriers to multilateral agreement remain, with securing a Canadian ratification of British accession to the CPTPP being a high priority for closer integration, but if CANZUK is actively pursued by all parties in a way similar to that described above the opportunities afforded will be significant.
Alexander Marshall
Guest contributor